Managing Trustworthiness in Component-based Embedded Systems  by Lenzini, Gabriele et al.
Managing Trustworthiness in
Component-based Embedded Systems 
Gabriele Lenzini, Andrew Tokmakoﬀ
Telematica Instituut, Brouwerijstraat 1,
7523 XC - Enschede, The Netherlands
{Gabriele.Lenzini,Andrew.Tokmakoff}@telin.nl
Johan Muskens
Philips Research, Prof. Holstlaan 4,
5656 AA - Eindhoven, The Netherlands
Johan.Muskens@philips.com
Abstract
Component-based systems use software components to achieve their overall high-level functionality which, in
turn, may be extended by initiating the download of new components. This action may detrimentally aﬀect
the system’s overall dependability and security characteristics. We address the problem of the enhancement
of dependability and security for component-based embedded systems that run, for example, in consumer
and embedded electronics devices. We propose a Trustworthiness Management Framework which, while
acting on the behalf of components (Trustors), supervises the system’s existing Trustor-Trustee relation-
ships and preserves the overall system level of dependability and security. This is achieved by monitoring
quality metrics on the components behaviours, by periodically evaluating their trustworthiness, and (when
applicable) by controlling them. This paper focuses on the trustworthiness evaluation process oﬀered by the
Trustworthiness Management Framework. Trustworthiness evaluation is seen as a Trustors-parameterisable
function. Trustworthiness is expressed with a triple of values: compliance, benignity and stability. The ﬁrst
measures the degree to which a component satisﬁes the Trustor’s requirement; the second and third express
the expected belief that, resp., the components will continue to be compliant and the component’s be-
havioural qualities will remain stable. Trustworthiness is used by the Trustworthiness Manager Framework
to make control decisions to regulate the system’s overall dependability and security characteristics.
Keywords: component-based systems, trustworthiness evaluation, trustworthiness management
architecture, dependability and security.
1 Introduction
Component-based software systems reach their high-level functionality through the
use of a number of components which, in turn, provide a set of basic services. On
 This work has been conducted within the ITEA-EU project “Trust4All” which includes members from
both industry and academia.
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a networked device, software components may also download new components into
the system, thereby extending the system’s capabilities at the risk of inadvertently
hosting malicious or unstable components.
We address the problem of enhancing dependability and security of compo-
nent-based embedded systems such as, for example, those supported by the Robo-
cop/Space4U infrastructure [13]. This infrastructure runs on a diverse set of plat-
forms for embedded consumer electronic devices, such as Symbian and Linux.
We study solutions that can be used to facilitate openness in such embedded
systems without sacriﬁcing their dependability and security characteristics. To
this aim we introduce a Trustworthiness Management Framework (in short, TMF)
which extends the existing Robocop/Space4U infrastructure with functionalities
that allow it to evaluate (on the behalf of applications/Trustors) the trustworthiness
of a component/Trustee with respect to some dependability and security quality
requirements. The TMF is also responsible for looking after the satisﬁability of the
requirements of all the active Trustor-Trustee relationships in the system.
This paper focuses on the TMF’s trustworthiness evaluation functionality. We
express trustworthiness as a triple: compliance, benignity and stability. Compli-
ance measures the degree of satisﬁability of a component with respect to a set
of Trustor-subjective quality requirements. Benignity and stability are deﬁned as
Subjective Logic [7] opinions; they express the Trustor-subjective expectation that
a component’s quality attributes will continue, respectively, to be compliant with
the Trustor’s requirements and to range over a neighbourhood of the values used
for the last compliance evaluation.
Trustworthiness is used by the TMF to make control decisions. For example a
negative compliance may result in action against the component e.g., its deactiva-
tion. A decrease in stability may trigger a re-estimation of the quality attributes and
compliance re-evaluation, while a decrease in benignity may cause the component
to be re-instantiated in a diﬀerent mode of operation or in a controlled environment.
2 Related Work
Trust Management has recently attracted the attention of Computer Science re-
search especial for the application areas of distributed access control and reputa-
tion networks management. (cf., [3,9]). The problem of trustworthiness evaluation
that we address has many similarities with the task of selecting a trustworthy web
service. Users generally favour web services that they expect will honour their agree-
ments as described in the form of previously established a Service Level Agreement
(SLA). For example [15] suggests that a web-service can be ranked according to a
trust value that is calculated by a trusted registry using a set of user reports on the
service over time.
A comparable approach, but in the domain of component-based systems, is dis-
cussed by Herrmann and Krumm in [5]; a component’s trustworthiness is obtained
from a Trust Information Service that stores components’ reputation as experienced
their users. The authors also propose a framework for security enhancement that
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operate in a J2EE environment; here, components are controlled by Java-bean se-
curity wrappers that check the compliance of component’s actual behaviour against
its declared behaviour, encoded as state-dependent security constraints (expressed
in terms of security automata or cTLA expressions). The level of the security checks
depends on the component’s trustworthiness, which wrappers obtain from the Trust
Information Service (see also [4]).
Although our approach has some similarities the proposal of Herrmann and
Krumm, the solution proposed be can not be eﬀectively applied in the domain
of resource-constrained embedded systems. Our components run in the Robo-
cop/Space4U infrastructure which does not beneﬁt from the security mechanisms
oﬀered by the Java Virtual Machine. In addition, we are interested in ensuring
trustworthiness with respect to dependability and security qualitative characteris-
tics, such as for example CPU consumption, memory usage, presence of encryption
mechanisms, integrity data via checksums, mean time between failure, et cetera.
Our TMF is embedded in the component middle-ware and acts with a resource
management framework to take decisions on components at their instantiation time.
Low level mechanisms, such as BSD jails or sandboxes, may be required in this case;
alternatively, components can be re-conﬁgured to operate in a diﬀerent mode of op-
eration. An overall re-evaluation of the trustworthiness of each Trustor-Trustee
relationship may be also reconsidered when a new component is admitted into the
system, because this may impact on the overall resource distribution amongst com-
ponents. Finally, our framework is designed to be parametrised, at run-time, by
applications/Trustors that specify their subjective trustworthiness requirements in
terms of metrics and a trustworthiness thresholds.
In [10], a trustworthiness measure is deﬁned by two quantities: the ability to
deliver the promised quality of service (called “conformance”), and the constancy
in delivering the agreed level of quality (called “verity”), deﬁned as the variance of
the conformance over time. Our trust values benignity and stability are expressed
as Subjective Logic opinions, and this facilitates their use in a recommendation
management systems.
3 On Trust and Trustworthiness
The concept of “Trustworthiness” is related to the notion of “Trust”. An entity is
trustworthy (for a certain task) when we have a assurance that it will perform its
promised service as expected [2]. Unfortunately, in many cases is almost impossible
to have an unquestionable assurance about the trustworthiness of an entity; there-
fore, the choice of considering an entity trustworthy for a certain task involves a
decision to trust. In this paper, we utilise the following deﬁnition of Trust [12]:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Trust is the extent to which one party (the Trustor) is willing to
depend on another party (the Trustee) in a given situation with a feeling of relative
security, even though negative consequences are possible.
Depending upon the speciﬁc scenario the Trustor and the Trustee roles can be
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Fig. 1. States of a Trustor-Trustee relationship.
fulﬁlled by diﬀerent types of entities. From the perspective of dependability and
security, in this paper we consider Trustors and Trustees to be software components.
Example 3.2 For her daily running exercises, Alice wears a T-shirt that has sen-
sors and an open and component-based computing device attached. The device’s
main component, C, collects and stores data from the sensors. C may extend its
functionality by acquiring new components, for example those in the class “Sweat-
Heart”. These components are able to communicate with a training centre that, in
turn, analyses the heartbeat data and provides real-time notiﬁcation to C if it detects
any anomalies. In this case, the Trustor is the component C which is accountable
for selecting and interacting with a “Sweat-Heart” component instance, whilst the
Trustee is the speciﬁc “Sweat-Heart” component selected.
4 Trustworthiness Manager Role
Figure 1 shows the states of a Trustor-Trustee relationship. Before making a deci-
sion to trust, a Trustor evaluates the trustworthiness of a Trustee. If the evaluation
results in positive, the Trustor decides in favour of a Trustee. Later, analysis of
observations on the Trustee’s behaviour may trigger a re-evaluation of the trust-
worthiness and a new decision-making process.
When the Trustor is a software component in an embedded system, the “health”
of Trustor-Trustee relationships may be assisted by a Trustworthiness Manager,
which is the role played by the TMF (introduced in Section 1).
Before the Trustworthiness Evaluation transition in Figure 1, the Trustwor-
thiness Manager, parametrised with the Trustor’s requirements, can evaluate the
trustworthiness of a speciﬁc Trustee on the behalf of the Trustor. We denote this
functionality “Trustworthiness Evaluation Function” and it will be the topic of Sec-
tion 8. Once the transition Decision to Trust has been made, the Trustworthiness
Manager may perform observations regarding the Trustee’s operation (e.g., perfor-
mance statistics). Through analysis of this data, the Trustworthiness Manager is
able to keep care of the Trustor-Trustee relationship (on the behalf of the Trustor)
and to prevent potential damage that may occur when a Trustee starts failing to
fulﬁl the Trustor’s dependability and security requirements, that is, when its pro-
ﬁle changes for the “worse”). In this case, the Trustor beneﬁts, indirectly, from
“damage control” mechanisms (e.g., BSD Jail [11], sandboxes [1], etc.) that the
Trustworthiness Manager may utilise upon the Trustee.
These control mechanisms can also be activated by the Trustworthiness Man-
ager in case of new Trustor-Trustee relationships within the system. For example,
consider the situation in which a component has been admitted to the system, tak-
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ing into account its assertion that it will never utilise more than 25% of the CPU
in any given 1 minute period. If, for example, there is another component in the
system that has been guaranteed 65% of the CPU in a given 1 minute period, and
the newly added component is observed to be consuming 40% of the CPU, then the
Trust Manager can either check if the ﬁrst component is still compliant although
using less CPU and in case not decide to “remove” the new component from the
system as its behaviour threatens to de-stabilise the system as a whole.
In synthesis, the Trustworthiness Manager is able to ensure that the overall
system remains in a “steady state” that respects all of the Trustor-Trustee relation-
ships.
Example 4.1 (continued) Alice decides to trial a version of the component
“Sweat-Heart”, on the condition that new component never discloses her data to
third parties (e.g., the training centre) while she is training. Only when Alice is run-
ning in a competition, will she accept a small risk of information leakage against
the beneﬁt of an immediate feedbacks regarding possible heart dysfunctions. The
Trustworthiness Manager, parametrised by component C, evaluates positively the
component “Sweat-Heart” supplied by the Company “Fast&Well”. This component
can work in two modes, either “secure” or “fast”. The “secure” mode implements
secure (but slower and more power-consuming) communications (e.g., it ensures
data integrity and conﬁdentiality), whilst the “fast” mode utilises faster networking
communications mechanisms without focusing on security aspects. After the new
component has been admitted into the system, the Trustworthiness Manager contin-
ues to monitor its performances. When Alice is running in a competition and the
communication speed of the component slows down, the Trustworthiness Manager
(on the behalf of C) decide to switch the component to “fast” mode.
5 Trustworthiness Management Framework
The TMF, developed using the Robocop/Space4U infrastructure [13], performs the
role of Trust Manager as discussed in Section 4.
Moreover, the TMF makes use of “actuators” to convert the logical “control”
decisions into actions which can, for example, reduce the priority of the compo-
nent or signal it to change to a diﬀerent mode of operation (with a diﬀerence set
of asserted QA’s) etc. For example, when a component is exhibiting QA metrics
(through observation) that deviate from its expected QA’s, it may be necessary to
stop the component, or to perhaps re-start it. In this case, the Decision-making
process makes a high-level decision (an action primitive) that is passed to the ac-
tuator(s). These actuators are responsible for mapping the decisions into concrete
actions. This distinction separates decision-making from actions, where the one
part is the “head” and the other part the “hands”. Actuators may also be able
to supply events to the decision-making process, forming a feedback loop. The in-
depth discussion of the TMF’s design, is ongoing work and beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Fig. 2. Trustworthiness Management is deﬁned in terms of the Trustworthiness Model and the Trust
Management Model Framework.
6 Models for Trustworthiness Management
This section explains our approach in the design of the TMF. It based on the deﬁ-
nition of two main models: the Trustworthiness Model and the Trust Management
Framework Model, which are shown in Figure 2.
The Trustworthiness Model deﬁnes the structure of the information required for
both Trustworthiness Evaluation and Trustor’s decision-making. Our Trustworthi-
ness Model suggests that the Trustee’s proﬁle is deﬁned and described in a Quality
Proﬁle Model, and that the way of reasoning of the Trustor, when it uses a certain
component, is supplied in the Trustworthiness Proﬁle Model. We describe those
models in Section 7.
The Trust Management Framework Model describes the mechanisms and solu-
tions used for monitoring the Trustee’s quality attributes metrics and for controlling
certain Trustee quality attributes. Monitoring includes a mechanism that can ob-
tain measurements e.g., CPU load, Process Memory footprint, network usage (num-
ber of sockets, bandwidth utilisation), containment level of a component, attempts
to access unauthorised resources, component lock-up, component non-availability,
etc. The control of quality attributes is realised, for example, by the possibility of
switching the Trustee to operate in certain modes, or by the availability of controlled
environments where the Trustee can be “safely” run.
Finally, the TMF Model speciﬁes the Trustworthiness Evaluation Function, a
functionality that is oﬀered to the Trustor for evaluating a Trustee’s trustworthiness
(see Section 8).
7 Trustworthiness Model
The Trustworthiness Model is composed of a Quality Proﬁle Model, associated
with the Trustee and of a Trustworthiness Proﬁle Model associated with the
Trustor/Trustee relationship.
7.1 Quality Proﬁle Model
The Quality Proﬁle Model deﬁnes the information necessary to describe the be-
havioural characteristics of the Trustee. Formally, a Quality Proﬁle Model QP is a
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set {M1, . . . ,Mk} of modes, where each mode M is a set {QA1, . . . ,QAh} of quality
attributes, and each quality attribute QA is a tuple 〈m1, . . . ,ml〉 of metrics.
Components may have numerous modes of operation (e.g., “secure” mode, “fast”
mode etc) , which may have diﬀerent characteristics, called quality attributes (QA),
that describe and quantify aspects of the component’s behaviour e.g., in terms of
its reliability, availability, etc. Each QA is speciﬁed by a deﬁned tuple of metrics.
In [2], Avizˇienis et al. provided a taxonomy of the metrics that can be utilised
for Dependability and Security. For example, the QA Availability (which is deﬁned
as “readiness for correct service”), can be expressed in terms of Response Time
which expresses the average delay between the issuance of a service request and
the moment in which the service is delivered, and Uptime which expresses the
percentage of service requests that result in correct service provisioning. Instances
of Quality Proﬁles (that we also write QA) carry the values of the metric and they
can be easily coded into a XML ﬁle.
Example 7.1 (continued) The Quality Proﬁle Model of a “Sweat-Heart” compo-
nent contains two modes, “secure” and “fast”. Both of these modes are composed
of an “availability” QA (in terms of “response time” in msec and “uptime” as a
percentage), and a “security” QA (in terms of presence/absence of security features
able to ensure conﬁdentiality and integrity). An instance of the Quality Proﬁle Model
carries the behavioural information related to a speciﬁc component. For example,
the following table
availability security
response time uptime conﬁdentiality integrity
17 0.98 1 0
represents the QA of the “Fast&Well” component’s “secure” mode (ref. Exam-
ple 4.1). It indicates the “response time” is 17msec, the “uptime” is, on average,
98% and that it implements mechanisms that ensure conﬁdentiality but not integrity
when communicating.
7.2 Trustworthiness Proﬁle Model
A Trustworthiness Proﬁle Model, speciﬁed by a Trustor, is associated with each
Trustor/Trustee relationship and it states: (i) the quality metrics the Trustor con-
siders important for trustworthiness evaluation of a certain kind of component; (ii)
the criteria to be used when evaluating the related metrics; (iii) the criteria to be
adopted for local decision-making. Here, we only describe part of Trustworthiness
Proﬁle Model that is concerned with the trustworthiness evaluation function (i.e.,
items (i)-(ii)). This model has a similar structure to that of the Quality Proﬁle
Model except that its purpose is to represent the “demands” of the Trustor with
respect to the Trustee.
A Trustworthiness Proﬁle Model TP is a set {M1, . . . ,Mk′} of modes. As with
the Quality Proﬁle, the Trustworthiness Proﬁle has modes that represent diﬀerent
modalities of judgements in diﬀerent contexts. Each mode M is a set {(QA1,W1),
. . . , (QAh′ ,Wh′)} of QA attributes and QA weightings. Weightings, such that
G. Lenzini et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 179 (2007) 143–155 149
∑h′
i=1 Wi = 1, expresses the importance the Trustor places upon speciﬁc quality
attributes. Here, the Trustor can consider judgement only a subset of the charac-
teristics speciﬁed in the Quality Proﬁle Model of the potential Trustee. Each qual-
ity attribute QA is a tuple 〈(m1, 〈P1, f
−
1 , f
+
1 〉, w1, 1), . . . , (ml, 〈Pl, f
−
l , f
+
l 〉, wl, l)〉
of metrics, metric criteria, metric weightings and tolerance percentages. Metric
weightings, such that
∑l
i=1 wi = 1, express the importance the Trustor gives to
each metric. The Trustor’s criteria in judging the Trustee’s quality attributes are
formalised in terms of the following items:
1) a crisp predicate P : T → {0; 1}.
Here T is the data domain of metric. It identiﬁes the QA’s metric values being
either (crisply) compliant or not compliant from the Trustor’s perspective;
2) two fuzzy sets f−, f+ : T → [0, 1].
Here f− and f+ measure the level of positive and negative compliance resp., of
the metric with respect to the predicate. These fuzzy sets are deﬁned via a pair of
functions c+ : {x : T, P (x)} → [0, 1] and c− : {x : T,¬P (x)} → [0, 1] (called metric
positive and metric negative compliance functions resp.), as follows:
f+(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
c+(x), if P (x)
0, otherwise
f−(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
c−(x), if ¬P (x)
0, otherwise
3) a tolerance percentage , which expresses the degree to which the Trustor will
tolerate variation in the Trustee’s observed metric value as absolute variations
of m.
Predicates, fuzzy sets, weightings and tolerance percentages are used to parame-
terise the Trustworthiness Evaluation Function, as explained in Section 8.
Example 7.2 (continued) Alice’s “training” mode Trustworthiness Proﬁle ex-
presses that the Trustee component should be assessed according to its availabil-
ity and security QA’s: the component’s response time must be less than 12msec
and its uptime at least 95%; moreover, it must exercise conﬁdentiality mechanism,
whilst the assurance of integrity is appreciated but optional. The following table
summarises the associated criteria.
Wq1 = 0.6 Wq2 = 0.4
availability(q1) security(q2)
wx1 = 0.5; x1 = 0.01 wx2 = 0.5; x2 = 0.01 wy1 = 0.75; y1 = 0 wy2 = 0.25; y2 = 0
response time(x1) uptime(x2) conﬁdentiality(y1) integrity(y2)
P (x1 < 12) (x2 > 0.95) (y1 = 1) (y2 <= 1)
c+ 1− x1
12
(x2−0.95
0.05
)2 1 y2
c− 1− 12
x1
1− x2
0.95
0 y2
Here, availability is weighted 0.6, whilst security 0.4; this means that the former is
more important to the Trustor than the latter. Within availability the two metrics
are equally weighted, whilst within security, the presence of mechanisms for ensuring
conﬁdentiality is twice important as the presence of integrity mechanisms. Finally,
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Fig. 3. The functional block of the Trustworthiness Evaluation Function.
the Trustor accepts a variance of 1% in the measured availability while observing
the “in service” behaviour of the Trustee .
8 Trustworthiness Evaluation Function
The Trustworthiness Evaluation (TEF, in Figure 3) is conceived as a function tef :
TProﬁles × 2QAttributes × Context → TValues that, given as input an instance of a
Trustworthiness Proﬁle Model, a set of QA (i.e., instances of the Trustee’s Quality
Proﬁle Model), and contextual data, returns a trustworthiness value. HereTProﬁles ,
QAttributes, Context , and TValues represent the data domains of the inputs and
of the output respectively. We denote tef(tp,c)(Q) to be tef instantiated with the
Trustor proﬁle tp ∈ TProﬁles in the context c ∈ Context . Here, the context is
managed in the easiest way i.e., to select the appropriate mode in tp; we refer to
[16] for an advanced discussion about how to deal with context in trustworthiness
evaluation. Therefore, tef(tp,c) transforms a set of QAs, Q ∈ 2
QAttributes into a
subjective trustworthiness value that can be used for decision-making. Referring to
Figure 3, we can see diﬀerent QAs as inputs, viz. Q = QAe ∪ Qo ∪ QAr . They
correspond to diﬀerent views on the QA’s of the Trustee, namely:
• QAe is the estimated QAs. It is the QA as understood by the Trustor. Initially
(when the trustworthiness evaluation is called for before any decision to trust as
shown in Figure 1) these are the QAs that the component (or someone on its
behalf, e.g., the provider of the component) has “asserted”. Further on, these
are the QAs that the Trustworthiness Management Framework has estimated to
better represent the “real” QAs of the Trustee.
• Qo is the set of observed QAs. It is the set of QAs ﬁlled in by the TMF as
the result of repeated monitoring activities. Initially this set is empty. Later, it
denotes the set of observations collected by the TMF.
• QAr is the set of recommendations that the Trustor obtains from its network of
recommenders (e.g., see [8]). In this paper recommendations are discussed only
marginally.
As a trustworthiness value v ∈ TValues, we propose a triple (CV,B, S). The
CV , called compliance, is the value resulting from analysis of QAe. It measures the
degree of compliance of QAe with respect to the Trustor’s criteria (e.g., predicates,
fuzzy sets and weightings); the B, called benignity, is the result of analysis of Qo ∪
QAr. It expresses the subjectiveinput expectation of the Trustor belief that a
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component will continue to be compliant with its requirements; the S, called stability
comes from the analysis of Qo. It expresses the Trustor’s subjective belief that
the current component’s QAs will remain within the Trustor-speciﬁed tolerance
percentage. The calculation of (CV,B, S) makes use of fuzzy sets [14] and Subjective
Logic [7].
Fuzzy sets are used in the calculation of CV over the QAe with the following
algorithm: given a metric m of a qa ∈ QAe the corresponding fuzzy sets f
+, f−
in tp are used to calculate a single (w.r.t that metric) compliance as cv(m) =
f+(m) − f−(m). Here cv : T → [−1, 1], where T is the domain of the metric.
An output in (0, 1] shows a positive compliance (the degree of belonging to the
compliant set), one in [-1,0) a negative compliance (the degree of belonging to the
non-compliant set), while the value 0 expresses a neutral compliance. The CV
over QAe is calculated from single compliance values, as the following weighted
summation that uses the weightings as speciﬁed in tp:
CV =
∑
qa∈QAe
Wqa (
∑
m∈qa
wm cv(m))
Example 8.1 (continued) Let us consider the quality attributes speciﬁed in Ex-
ample 7.1, and the trustworthiness proﬁle given in Section 7.2 CV is calculated as
follows
CV =0.6
(
0.5 cv(response time) + 0.5 cv(uptime)
)
+
0.4
(
0.75 cv(conﬁdentiality) + 0.25 cv(integrity)
)
=0.6
(
0.5 (−(1−
12
17
)) + 0.5 (
0.98 − 0.95
0.95
)2
)
+ 0.4
(
0.75 (1) + 0.25 (0)
)
=0.319
that indicates that in general the requirements on the Trustee’s QAs are fulﬁlled.
Subjective Logic (SL) [7] is used here to generate “opinions” on the subject “is
the predicate P satisﬁed by Qo, the observed QA”. A SL opinion is denoted by
ωP = (bP , dP , uP ). Here bP , dP , uP ∈ [0, 1] represent the subjective belief, disbelief
and uncertainty respectively, in the truth of statement P , where bP + dP + uP = 1.
From an opinion ωP we can obtain the probability, E(ωP ), of the expectation of
the belief, by using the relation E(ωP ) = bP +
1
2uP . When the statement P , for
example, says “the metric m is compliant” then ωP can be interpreted as trust in
the metric being compliant, whilst E(ωP ) is the probability of the expectation of the
metric to be compliant [6]. Opinions can be combined using SL operators. Given
two opinions ωP and ωP ′ , over two predicates P and P
′, then ωP ∧ω
′
P is the opinion
over the predicate P ∧ P ′. Given two opinions ωAP and ω
B
P over P from diﬀerent
sources A and B, then ωAP ⊕ ω
B
P is the opinion that expresses a consensus e.g., a
Bayesian fusion of the two opinions. The interested reader can ﬁnd more detail on
SL operators in [6,7].
Opinions can be generated from an evidence space [6]. The procedure is quite
standard for the SL, with a slight personalisation to our case. Given an evidence
space S and a predicate P , an opinion ωP = (b, d, u) from S on P can be obtained
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with the following formulae:
b = r
r+s+t+1 d =
s
r+s+t+1 u =
t+1
r+s+t+1
(1)
where r, s are the number of items in S that satisfy, do not satisfy resp., predicate P ,
whilst t is the number of items for which the evaluation of the predicate is uncertain
(e.g., the datum was corrupted or missing, or we are using a three-valued predicate
and the result cannot be interpreted as neither positive nor negative).
Benignity is the opinion ωPCV calculated using Qo as evidence space. Here
PCV is the three-valued predicate that returns -1 if CV < 0, 0 if CV = 0, -1
otherwise. Informally, benignity models the Trustor’s trust in the Trustee’s behavior
being compliant with its requirements. We can use benignity also when dealing
with past Trustee’s “reputation” according to the Trustor’s viewpoint. A previous
benignity value, Bpast, can be combined with the present benignity, B, to obtain a
(history-dependent) benignity B′ = B ⊕Bpast. Benignity value can also be used to
recommend a Trustee to other Trustors. In this case, QA’s in QAr are benignity
values experienced by other systems, and they can be combined with the local
benignity to reach a ﬁnal consensus. To deal with network of recommendations,
and to cope with the related problems, can utilise the techniques developed in [8].
Stability is calculated as S =
(∧
qa∈QA(
∧
m∈qa ωPm,
)
. Here, ωPm, is the opinion
calculated usingQo and the predicate Pm,, which returns 1 if m ∈ [me−·me,me+·
me], -1 otherwise. Here,  is the tolerance associated to m in tp, and me is the metric
value used of the estimated QA. Stability models the Trustor’s trust in the Trustee’s
behavior to remain in the neighbourhood of the estimated values, that is those used
in the last compliance evaluation. Stability’s can be made history-dependent if we
combine the present stability with a past stability Trustee’s “reputation” (according
to the Trustor’s viewpoint), viz. S′ = S ⊕ Spast.
Example 8.2 In reference to Example 7.1 and Example 7.2, let us assume that
from 100 observations of the “Sweat-Heart” component behaviour, 50 show a QA
{〈17, 0.98〉, 〈1, 0〉}, 50 a QA {〈11, 0.96〉, 〈1, 0〉}, and one a QA {〈12, 0.95〉, 〈0, 1〉}.
The Benignity value we obtain, (0.98, 0.01, 0.01), shows a belief in the component
to continue being compliant with the requirements (cf. Example 7.2). Stability
results in a value (0.23, 0.75, 0.02) ﬂagging that there is a disbelief in the stability
of the overall QAs of the component, with respect to values used in the compliance
evaluation. In this case, the presence of a disbelief means that it is better to re-
estimate the QAe. By using the same set of observations, we obtain the averaged
QAe being {〈14.4, 0.96〉, 〈0.5, 0〉} whose compliance is -0.338.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have introduced and discussed the development of a Trustworthi-
ness Management Framework (TMF), which is a practical software solution used to
enhance the dependability and security of networked, extensible, component-based
embedded systems. The TMF, running in the middle-ware, supports components
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(in the role of Trustor) to take the right decision to trust, and implements both
solutions for monitoring the behaviour of a component and mechanisms of control
that can be activated upon the component (in the role of Trustee) to safeguard the
dependability and security.
We have focused on the Trustworthiness Evaluation Function (TEF) oﬀered by
the TMF, which components can parameterise according to the criteria they wish
to use when evaluating the Trustee’s compliance. Additionally, trustworthiness is
evaluated in terms of: “benignity” (i.e., the belief that the Trustee will continue
to be compliant) and “stability” (i.e., belief that the Trustee’s behaver will remain
within expected boundaries).
Benignity and stability are used for decision-making by the TMF, and the cal-
culation of their values is deﬁned in terms of Subjective Logic operators. The TEF
has been prototyped in Ocaml 1 which has been interfaced with a Robocop [13]
component written in C. We are now commencing a validation phase in which we
will evaluate the use of the TMF in a variety of applications in the domains of
health care, entertainment, and communication.
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